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Abstract
We investigate how to model indifference with choice func-
tions. We take the coherence axioms for choice functions
proposed by Seidenfeld, Schervisch and Kadane as a source
of inspiration, but modify them to strengthen the connec-
tion with desirability. We discuss the properties of choice
functions that are coherent under our modified set of ax-
ioms and the connection with desirability. Once this is
in place, we present an axiomatisation of indifference in
terms of desirability. On this we build our characterisation
of indifference in terms of choice functions.
Keywords. Choice function, coherence, indifference, set
of desirable gambles, maximality, E-admissibility.
1 Introduction
The language of classical probability—(probability) mass
functions, say—is insufficiently versatile and powerful to
describe certain aspects of beliefs, such as indecision. Im-
precise probability uncertainty models, such as coherent
lower previsions and coherent sets of desirable gambles,
are often used to remedy this. Coherent sets of desirable
gambles in particular play a crucial role in theories of con-
servative reasoning [16], predictive inference [10], credal
networks [6], and so on. They have many advantages, such
as mathematical elegance and the lack of problems for
conditioning on an event with (lower) probability zero.
However, they are not capable of modelling beliefs corre-
sponding to ‘or’ statements, such as the belief that a coin
has two equal sides of unknown type—twice heads or twice
tails. It turns out such more general types of assessments
can be modelled with choice functions.
To allow for incomparability, Seidenfeld, Schervisch and
Kadane [23] introduce axioms for rational choice expressed
by choice functions that are a weakened version of the ones
suggested by Rubin [18]. We modify them slightly, in order
to allow for Walley–Sen maximality [28, 26] to be coher-
ent, and we drop their Archimedean continuity axiom to
allow for a more direct connection with coherent sets of
desirable gambles. We introduce our notion of coherence
for choice functions in Section 2. We work with abstract
vectors (called options), rather than horse lotteries or gam-
bles: this will allow us to deal with indifference without
too many mathematical difficulties, later on in this paper.
Because we are interested in conservative reasoning with
coherent choice functions, we introduce an ‘is not more
informative than’ ordering, which allows us to consider
the most conservative choice function compatible with an
assessment as an infimum associated with this partial order.
In Section 3, we relate our theory of coherent choice func-
tions to coherent sets of desirable options, and identify
the most conservative coherent choice function compat-
ible with a coherent set of desirable options as the one
associated with Walley–Sen maximality: it selects the un-
dominated options under the strict partial order generated
by a coherent set of desirable options, and is therefore fully
based on binary choice.
In Section 4, we show that there are other general classes
of coherent choice functions not based on binary choice,
and we relate them to each other.
An important aspect of any uncertainty theory is how it
deals with indifference. Adding indifference to the picture
typically reduces the complexity of the modelling effort.
Also, knowing how to model indifference opens up a path
towards modelling symmetry, which has many important
practical applications. As an example of both aspects, the
permutation symmetry that lies behind exchangeability has
important applications in statistical modelling, and reduces
the complexity of the modelling effort, as is exemplified by
de Finetti’s representation theorem [12]. Our treatment here
lays the foundation for dealing with, say, exchangeability
for choice functions.
In Section 5, we give an intuitive definition of indifference
for choice functions that reduces to the existing account for
sets of desirable gambles (options). We exhibit the power
and simplicity of our definition of indifference in an inter-
esting example.
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2 Choice Functions on Option Sets
Consider a real vector space V , provided with the vector
addition + and scalar multiplication. We denote by 0 the
additive identity, or null vector. For any subsets O1 and O2
of V and any λ in R, we define λO1 ∶= {λu ∶ u ∈ O1} and
O1 +O2 ∶= {u+ v ∶ u ∈ O1,v ∈ O2}. Elements u of V are in-
tended as abstract representations of options amongst which
a subject can express his preferences, by specifying, as we
shall see below, choice functions. Mostly, options will be
real-valued maps on the possibility space, also called gam-
bles. We want to work with the more abstract notion of
options—elements of some general vector space—because
in Section 5, we will need choice functions defined on
equivalence classes of options. These constitute a vector
space—and hence are abstract options themselves—but can
no longer be interpreted easily and directly as gambles.
We denote by Q(V) the set of all non-empty finite subsets
of V , a strict subset of the power set of V . Elements O
of Q(V) are the option sets amongst which a subject can
choose his preferred options. When it is clear what vector
space of options we are talking about, we will omit explicit
mention of V and simply write Q.
Definition 1. A choice function C on Q is a map
C∶Q→Q∪{∅}∶O↦C(O) such that C(O) ⊆O.
We collect all choice functions in the set C.
The idea underlying this definition is that a choice func-
tion C selects the set C(O) of ‘best’ options in the option
set O. Our definition resembles the one commonly used in
the literature [1, 23, 25], except for a not unusual restriction
to finite option sets [13, 19, 24].
2.1 Rationality Axioms
Seidenfeld et al. [23, Section 3] call a choice function C
coherent if there is a non-empty set of probability-utility
pairs S such that C(O) is the set of options in O that max-
imise expected utility for some probability-utility pair in S .
They also provide an axiomatisation for this type of co-
herence, based on the one for binary preferences [2]. One
of their axioms is an ‘Archimedean’ continuity condition,
and another one is a convexity condition, necessary for the
connection with a set of probability-utility pairs.
We prefer to define coherence directly in terms of ax-
ioms, without reference to probabilities and utilities. In
such a context, we see no compelling reason to adopt an
Archimedean axiom, all the more so because we are inter-
ested in establishing the connection between choice func-
tions and Walley’s sets of desirable gambles Walley [29],
which violate this axiom. Furthermore, the convexity con-
dition does not allow for choice functions that select the
undominated options under some partial ordering, which is
something we find natural, and shall need later on.
We will weaken their axioms in Section 2.1.2 by dropping
the Archimedean condition and by replacing their convexity
condition with a weaker variant. On the other hand, our
second axiom is a strengthened version of theirs, needed
for the conditioning we intend to discuss in a later paper.
2.1.1 Some Useful Definitions
We call N the set of all (positive) integers, and N0 ∶=N∪{0}. Also, we call R>0 the set of all (strictly) positive real
numbers, and R≥0 ∶=R>0∪{0}.
Given any subset O of V , we define the linear hull span(O)
as the set of all finite linear combinations of elements of O:
span(O) ∶= { n∑
k=1λkuk ∶ n ∈N,λk ∈R,uk ∈O} ⊆ V,
the positive hull posi(O) as the set of all positive finite
linear combinations of elements of O:
posi(O) ∶= { n∑
k=1λkuk ∶ n ∈N,λk ∈R>0,uk ∈O} ⊆ V,
and the convex hull CH(O) as the set of convex combina-
tions of elements of O:
CH(O) ∶={ n∑
k=1αkuk ∶n ∈N,αk ∈R≥0,
n∑
k=1αk =1,uk ∈O}⊆V.
A subset O of V is called a convex cone if it is closed under
positive finite linear combinations, i.e. if posi(O) = O. A
convex cone K is called proper if K∩−K = {0}.
With any proper convex cone K ⊆ V such that 0 ∈ K, we
associate an ordering ⪯ on V , defined for all u and v in V
as follows:
u ⪯K v⇔ v−u ∈K⇔ 0 ⪯K v−u⇔ u−v ⪯K 0.
We also write u ⪰K v for v ⪯K u. The ordering ⪯K is actu-
ally a vector ordering: it is a partial order (reflexive, anti-
symmetric and transitive) that satisfies the following two
characteristic properties:
u1 ⪯K u2⇔ u1+v ⪯K u2+v; (1)
u1 ⪯K u2⇔ λu1 ⪯K λu2, (2)
for all u1,u2,v in V and λ inR>0. Conversely, given a vector
ordering ⪯, the proper convex cone K from which it is
derived can always be retrieved byK ={u ∈V ∶u⪰ 0}. When
the abstract options are gambles, K will usually be the
non-negative orthant, and the ordering ⪯ is then pointwise.
When the options are equivalence classes, as in Section 5.2,
the ordering will be the induced ordering on equivalence
classes, as defined in Eq. (10).
The vector space of options V , ordered by the vector or-
dering ⪯K, is called an ordered vector space ⟨V,⪯K⟩. We
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shall refrain from explicitly mentioning the actual proper
convex cone K we are using, and simply write V to mean
the ordered vector space, and ⪯ for the associated vector
ordering.
Finally, with any vector ordering ⪯, we associate the strict
partial ordering ≺ as follows:
u≺ v⇔ (u⪯ v and u≠ v)⇔ v−u ∈K∖{0} for all u,v in V .
We call u positive if u ≻ 0, and collect all positive options
in the convex cone V≻0 ∶=K∖{0}.
2.1.2 Rationality axioms for choice functions
Definition 2. We call a choice function C on Q(V) coher-
ent if for all O,O1,O2 in Q, u,v in V and λ in R>0:
C1. C(O) ≠∅;
C2. if u ≺ v then {v} =C({u,v});
C3. a. if C(O2) ⊆O2∖O1 and O1 ⊆O2 ⊆O
then C(O) ⊆O∖O1;
b. if C(O2) ⊆O1 and O ⊆O2∖O1
then C(O2∖O) ⊆O1;
C4. a. if O1 ⊆C(O2) then λO1 ⊆C(λO2);
b. if O1 ⊆C(O2) then O1+{u} ⊆C(O2+{u});
C5. if O ⊆CH({u,v}) then {u,v}∩C(O∪{u,v}) ≠∅.1
We collect all coherent choice functions on V in the set C¯.
Parts C3a and C3b of Axiom C3 are respectively known
as Sen’s condition α and Aizerman’s condition. They are
more commonly written as, respectively:
(O1∩C(O2) =∅ and O1 ⊆O2 ⊆O)⇒O1∩C(O) =∅ (3)
and
(O1∩C(O2) =∅ and O ⊆O1)⇒O1∩C(O2∖O) =∅ (4)
for all O,O1,O2 in Q.
Proposition 1. The following statements hold for any co-
herent choice function C:
(i) λC(O)+ {u} = C(λO + {u}) for all O in Q, λ in
R>0 and u in V;
(ii) for all u1,u2 in V such that u1 ⪯ u2, all O in Q and
all v in O∖{u1,u2}:
a. if u2 ∈O and v ∉C(O∪{u1}) then v ∉C(O);
b. if u1 ∈O and v ∉C(O)
then v ∉C({u2}∪O∖{u1});
1This axiom is not needed to prove the results in this paper, and all
results remain valid without it. We include it because it seems reasonable:
the version with rational convex combinations can be derived from our
other axioms, so C5 amounts to requiring some very weak continuity. More
importantly, this axiom is instrumental for the proofs of some results not
included in this paper due to space limitations; because of this, we prefer
to keep a unified set of axioms in all of our work in this topic.
(iii) C is insensitive to the omission of non-chosen op-
tions [9, Definition 11]: C(O′) =C(O) for all O,O′
in Q such that C(O) ⊆O′ ⊆O;
(iv) C(C(O)) =C(O) for all O in Q.
For Bradley [3], any choice function must at least satisfy
property (iv). Seidenfeld et al. [23] impose the two proper-
ties (ii)a and (ii)b as rationality axioms [23, Axiom 4]. Our
proofs for them rely quite heavily on, amongst other things,
Axiom C2, which is a strengthened version of another of
their rationality axioms. This does not imply, however, that
our rationality axioms are stronger than theirs, since we
have dropped their Archimedean axiom [23, Axiom 3],
and replaced their convexity axiom [23, Axiom 2b] by our
strictly weaker variant C5.
2.2 The ‘Is Not More Informative Than’ Relation
Because we are interested in conservative reasoning with
choice functions, we look for the implications of a given as-
sessment that are as ‘uninformative’ as possible. Therefore,
we need some binary relation ⊑ on C, having the specific
interpretation of being ‘not more informative than’, or, in
other words, ‘at least as uninformative as’.
Definition 3. Given two choice functions C1 and C2 in C,
we call C1 not more informative than C2—and we write
C1 ⊑C2—if (∀O ∈Q)C1(O) ⊇C2(O).
This intuitive way of ordering choice functions is also used
by Bradley [3], and in earlier work by the authors [27]. The
underlying idea is that a choice function is more informative
when it chooses more specifically, or restrictively, amongst
the available options.
Since by definition ⊑ is a product ordering of set inclusions,
the following result is immediate [5].
Proposition 2. The structure (C;⊑) is a complete lattice:
(i) it is a partially ordered set, or poset, meaning that
the binary relation ⊑ on C is reflexive, antisymmetric
and transitive;
(ii) for any subset C′ of C, its infimum infC′ and its
supremum supC′ with respect to the ordering ⊑ exist
in C, and are given by infC′(O) =⋃C∈C′ C(O) and
supC′(O) =⋂C∈C′ C(O) for all O in Q.
The idea is that infC′ is the most informative model that
is not more informative than any of the models in C′, and
supC′ the least informative model that is not less informa-
tive than any of the models in C′.
We also consider the poset (C¯;⊑), where C¯ ⊆ C inherits the
partial order ⊑ from C.
Proposition 3. (C¯;⊑) is complete infimum-semilattice: C¯ is
closed under arbitrary non-empty infima, so infC′ ∈ C¯ for
any non-empty subset C′ of C¯.
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3 Relation with Sets of Desirable Options
Choice functions cannot be characterised using pairwise
comparison of options,2 meaning that a binary relation on
options does not uniquely determine a choice function. In
this section, we study the ones that do correspond to a
pairwise comparison of options.
3.1 Sets of Desirable Options
Sets of desirable options are a generalisation of sets of
desirable gambles. Gambles are real-valued maps on a pos-
sibility space X , interpreted as uncertain rewards. Such
gambles can be seen as vectors in the vector space RX .
Here we generalise this notion by looking at a general
(abstract) vector space V of (abstract) options, rather than
gambles. We shall see that sets of desirable options amount
to a pairwise comparison of options and therefore corre-
spond to a special kind of choice functions.
A set of desirable options D is simply a subset of the vector
space of options V . We collect all sets of desirable options
in the setD. As we did for choice functions, we pay special
attention to coherent sets of desirable options.
Definition 4. A set of desirable options D is called coher-
ent if for all u and v in V and λ in R>0:
D1. 0 ∉D;
D2. V≻0 ⊆D;
D3. if u ∈D then λu ∈D;
D4. if u,v ∈D then u+v ∈D.
We collect all coherent sets of desirable options in the set D¯.
Axioms D3 and D4 turn coherent sets of desirable options D
into cones—posi(D)=D. They include the positive options
due to Axiom D2, and do not contain the zero option due to
Axiom D1. As an immediate consequence, their intersection
with V≺0 ∶= −V≻0 is empty. As usual, we may associate
with the cone D a strict partial order ½ on V , by letting
u½ v⇔ 0½ v−u⇔ v−u ∈D, so D = {u ∈V ∶ 0½ u} [8, 16].
3.2 The ‘Is Not More Informative Than’ Relation
As for choice functions, sets of desirable options can be
ordered according to a ‘not more informative than’ relation.
Definition 5. Given two sets of desirable options D1,D2 inD, we call D1 not more informative than D2 when D1 ⊆D2.
Because the ordering of sets of desirable options ⊆ is just
set inclusion, it is a partial ordering on D, and the poset(D;⊆) is a complete lattice, with supremum operator ⋃,
and infimum operator ⋂.
2An equivalent representation of a coherent choice function C is a
binary relation ⊲ onQ—on sets of options—defined through O1 ⊲ O2⇔
O1∩C(O1∪O2) =∅ for all O1,O2 inQ. This binary relation ⊲ is a strict
partial order onQ [14].
Proposition 4. (D¯;⊆) is a complete infimum-semilattice,
or alternatively, D¯ is an intersection structure—closed un-
der arbitrary non-empty intersections.
Proposition 4 guarantees us that there is a unique least
informative set of desirable options in D¯, called the vacuous
set of desirable options Dv.
Proposition 5. The least informative (smallest) set of de-
sirable options Dv is given by Dv ∶= V≻0.
It will be useful to also consider the maximally informative,
or maximal coherent sets of desirable options.3 They are the
undominated elements of the complete infimum-semilattice(D¯;⊆); we collect them into a set Dˆ:
Dˆ ∶= {D ∈ D¯ ∶ (∀D′ ∈ D¯)(D ⊆D′⇒D =D′)}.
First we prove a useful proposition that will allow us to
characterise these maximal elements very elegantly.
Proposition 6. Given any coherent set of desirable options
D and any non-zero option u ∉D, then posi(D∪{−u}) is a
coherent set of desirable options.
Proposition 7. A coherent set of desirable options D is
maximal if and only if
(∀u ∈ V ∖{0})(u ∈D or −u ∈D). (5)
Proposition 8. For any coherent set of desirable options D,
its set of dominating maximal coherent sets of desirable
options DˆD ∶= {Dˆ ∈ Dˆ ∶D ⊆ Dˆ} is non-empty.
Proposition 9. (D¯;⊆) is dually atomic, meaning that any
coherent set of desirable options D is the infimum of its non-
empty set of dominating maximal coherent sets of desirable
options DˆD : D = infDˆD .
3.3 Connection Between Choice Functions and Sets
of Desirable Options
In this section, we establish a connection between choice
functions and sets of desirable options.
Definition 6. Given a choice functions C, we say that
an option v is chosen above some option u whenever
u ∉ C({u,v}), or equivalently whenever v ≠ u and {v} =
C({u,v}). Similarly, given a set of desirable options D, we
say that an option v is preferred to some option u whenever
v−u ∈D, or equivalently, u ½ v. We call a choice function
C and a set of desirable options D compatible when
u ∉C({u,v})⇔ v−u ∈D⇔ u ½ v for all u,v ∈ V .
Compatibility means that the behaviour of a choice func-
tion restricted to pairs of options reflects the behaviour of a
3The discussion in the rest of this section is based on similar discus-
sions about sets of desirable gambles [8, 4, 17]. We repeat the details here
mutatis mutandis to make the paper more self-contained.
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set of desirable options.4 So, a choice function C will have
at most one compatible set of desirable options, whereas
conversely, a set of desirable options D may have many
compatible choice functions: compatibility only directly in-
fluences the behaviour of a choice function on doubletons.
3.3.1 From Choice Functions to Desirability
We begin by studying the properties of the set of desirable
options compatible with a given coherent choice function.
Proposition 10. Given a coherent choice function C in C¯,
there is a unique compatible coherent set of desirable op-
tions DC , given by DC ∶= {u ∈ V ∶ 0 ∉C({0,u})}.
3.3.2 From Desirability to Choice Functions
We collect in C¯D all the compatible coherent choice func-
tions with the given coherent set of desirable options D:
C¯D ∶={C ∈ C¯ ∶ (∀u,v ∈ V)(v ∉C({u,v})⇔ u−v ∈D)}={C ∈ C¯ ∶DC =D}.
Proposition 11. Given a coherent set of desirable op-
tions D, the infimum—most uninformative element—inf C¯D
of its set of compatible coherent choice functions C¯D is the
coherent choice function CD , defined by
CD(O) ∶={u ∈O ∶ (∀v ∈O)v−u ∉D}={u ∈O ∶ (∀v ∈O)u /½ v} for all O in Q. (6)
The coherent choice function CD is the least informative
choice function that is compatible with a coherent set of
desirable options D: it is based on the binary ordering
represented by D and nothing else. As we shall see in
Proposition 17, there are other coherent choice functions C
compatible with D, but they encode more information than
just the binary ordering represented by D. Proposition 11
is especially interesting because it shows that the most
conservative choice function based on a strict partial order
of options, is the choice function based on maximality—the
one that selects the undominated options under the strict
partial order ½ associated with a coherent set of desirable
options D. Any choice function that is based on maximality
under such a strict partial order is coherent.
Proposition 3 guarantees that there is a unique smallest—
least informative—coherent choice function. We shall call
it the vacuous choice function, and denoted it by Cv.
Proposition 12. The vacuous choice function Cv is given
by Cv(O) = CDv(O) = {u ∈ O ∶ (∀v ∈ O)u ⊀ v} for all O
in Q. It selects from any set of options the ones that are
undominated under the strict vector ordering ≺.
4See Ref. [21] for an axiomatisation of imprecise preferences in the
context of binary comparisons of horse lotteries.
Example 1. Consider, as a simple example, the case that
the vector ordering is total, meaning that for any u,v
in V , either u ≺ v, v ≺ u or u = v. It then follows from
Proposition 12 that, for any coherent choice function C,
C(O) ⊆Cv(O) = maxO for all O ∈Q, where maxO is the
unique largest element of the finite option set O according
to the strict total ordering ≺. But then Axiom C1 guarantees
that C(O) =Cv(O) =maxO for all O ∈Q, so Cv is the only
coherent choice function.
3.3.3 Properties of the Relation Between Choice
Functions and Desirability
Since sets of desirable options represent only pairwise com-
parison, and are therefore generally less expressive than
choice functions, we expect that going from a choice func-
tion to a compatible set of desirable options leads to a loss
of information, whereas going the opposite route does not.
This is confirmed by Propositions 13 and 14, but in partic-
ular by their Corollary 15. Example 2 in Section 4 further
on shows that the inequalities in these results can be strict.
Proposition 13. Consider any set of coherent choice
functions C′ ⊆ C¯. Then DinfC′ = inf{DC ∶ C ∈ C′} and
Cinf{DC ∶C∈C′} ⊑ infC′, and therefore also CDinfC′ ⊑ infC′.
Proposition 14. Consider any set of coherent sets of de-
sirable options D′ ⊆ D¯ and any coherent set of desir-
able options D′. Then Dinf{CD ∶D∈D′} = infD′ and therefore
DCD′ =D′. Moreover, CinfD′ ⊑ inf{CD ∶D ∈D′}.
Corollary 15. Consider any coherent set of desirable op-
tions D ∈ D¯ and any coherent choice function C ∈ C¯. Then
D =DCD and CDC ⊑C.
4 Other Types of Coherent Choice
Functions
There are other types of coherent choice functions than the
ones ‘based on maximality’, derived from a coherent set of
desirable options by selecting undominated elements as in
Eq. (6). For instance, any infimum of such coherent choice
functions is still coherent.
Definition 7. For any set of coherent sets of desirable op-
tions D′ ⊆ D¯, we define the ‘infimum of maximality’ choice
function as CD′ ∶= inf{CD ∶D ∈D′}.
Proposition 16. Consider any set of coherent sets of desir-
able optionsD′ ⊆ D¯, then CD′ is a coherent choice function.
We now consider two special cases of these infimum of
maximality choice functions. In Definition 8, we focus only
on sets of maximal coherent sets of desirable options.
Definition 8. If D′ ⊆ Dˆ is a set of maximal coherent set
of desirable options, the coherent choice function CD′ is
called M-admissible. We shall also denote it by CMD′ as a
reminder that the infimum is taken over maximal sets.
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In particular, we can consider the M-admissible choice
functions for the set D′ = DˆD of all maximal coherent set
of desirable options that include a coherent set of desirable
options D. In order not to burden the notation, we let
CMD ∶=CMDˆD = inf{CDˆ ∶ Dˆ ∈ Dˆ and D ⊆ Dˆ}. (7)
Proposition 17. Consider any coherent set of desirable
options D′ ∈ D¯. Then D′ =DCM
D′ and CD′ ⊑CMD′ .
The inequality in Proposition 17 can be strict—meaning
that CD′ ⊏ CMD′ for some coherent set of desirable options
D′—as is shown in Example 3.
As another special case, we consider choice functions asso-
ciated with Levi’s [15, Chapter 5] notion of E-admissibility,
as suggested by Seidenfeld et al. [23], and Troffaes [26].
They are based on a non-empty set of mass functions. Con-
sider a finite possibility space X , and maps from X to R
(also called gambles), forming the vector space V =RX of
finite dimension ∣X ∣. The vector ordering ⪯ we associate
with this vector space is the pointwise ordering of real num-
bers: u ⪯ v⇔ (∀x ∈ X )ux ≤ vx, where, for instance, ux is
the x-component of the option u. We call any map p∶V →R
with (∀x ∈ X )p(x) ≥ 0 and ∑x∈X p(x) = 1 a (probability)
mass function, and we associate an expectation Ep with p
by letting Ep(u) ∶=∑x∈X p(x)ux for all u in V .
With a mass function p, we associate a set of desirable
options
Dp ∶= V≻0∪{u ∈ V ∶ Ep(u) > 0} (8)
and a choice function Cp defined for all O in Q by
Cp(O) ∶= {u ∈O ∶ (∀v ∈O)(Ep(u) ≥ Ep(v) and u⊀ v)}.
(9)
Proposition 18. The set of desirable options Dp and the
choice function Cp are coherent and compatible, and more-
over Cp =CDp .
This result allows us to introduce the following, second
special case of ‘infimum of maximality’ choice functions.
Definition 9. With any non-empty set of mass func-
tions K,5 we associate the corresponding E-admissible
choice function CEK ∶= inf{Cp ∶ p ∈K} =C{Dp ∶p∈K}.
Proposition 19. Given any non-empty set of mass func-
tions K, we have for all O in Q that
CEK(O) = {u ∈O ∶ (∃p ∈K)u ∈ argmax
v∈O Ep(v)}∩Cv(O).
The following proposition establishes a connection between
M-admissible and E-admissible choice functions.
5Although Levi’s notion of E-admissibility was originally [15, Chap-
ter 5] concerned with convex closed sets of mass functions, we impose no
such requirement here on the set K.
Proposition 20. For any non-empty set of mass func-
tions K, CEK ⊑CMDˆK , where DˆK ∶=⋃p∈K DˆDp ⊆ Dˆ.
The following examples show why choice functions are
more powerful than sets of desirable options as uncertainty
representations, and elucidates the difference between E-
admissible and M-admissible choice functions.
Example 2. Consider the situation where you have a coin
with two identical sides of unknown type: either both sides
are heads (H), or both sides are tails (T). The random vari-
able that represents the outcome of a coin flip assumes a
value in the finite possibility space X ∶= {H,T}. The op-
tions we consider are gambles: real-valued functions on X ,
which constitute the two-dimensional vector space RX , or-
dered by the pointwise order. We model this situation using
(a) coherent sets of desirable options, (b) M-admissible
choice functions, and (c) E-admissible choice functions. In
all three cases we start from two simple models: one that
describes practical certainty of H and another that describes
practical certainty of T, and we take their infimum—the
most informative model that is still less informative than
both—as a candidate model for the coin problem.
For (a), we use two coherent sets of desirable options
DH and DT, expressing practical certainty of H and T, re-
spectively, given by the maximal sets of desirable options
DH ∶=V≻0∪{u ∈V ∶ uH > 0} and DT ∶=V≻0∪{u ∈V ∶ uT > 0},
where uH and uT denote the values of the gamble u in H
and T, respectively. The model for the coin with two identi-
cal sides is then DH∩DT = V≻0. This vacuous model Dv is
incapable of distinguishing between this situation and the
one where we are completely ignorant about the coin.
For an approach (b) that distinguishes between these two
situations, we draw inspiration from Proposition 13: instead
of working with the sets of desirable options themselves,
we move to the corresponding choice functions CH ∶=CDH
and CT ∶=CDT , where
CH(O) = {u ∈O ∶ (∀v ∈O)v−u ∉DH}= argmax{uH ∶ u ∈O}∩Cv(O) for all O in Q
CT(O) = argmax{uT ∶ u ∈O}∩Cv(O) for all O in Q.
We infer that ∣CH(O)∣ = ∣CT(O)∣ = 1 for every O in Q.
The M-admissible choice function we are looking for is
CM{DH,DT} = inf{CH,CT}, which selects at most two options
from each option set. It is given by
CM{DH,DT}(O)= (argmax{uH ∶ u ∈O}∪argmax{uT ∶ u ∈O})∩Cv(O)
for all O in Q, and differs from the vacuous choice func-
tion Cv. Indeed, consider the particular option set O ={u,v,w}, where u = (1,0), v = (0,1) and w = (1/2,1/2). Then
CM{DH,DT}(O) = {u,v} ≠O =Cv(O).
For (c), the set of mass functions K consists of the two
degenerate mass functions: K = {pH, pT}, where pH = (1,0)
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and pT = (0,1). The corresponding expectations EH ∶= EpH
and ET ∶= EpT satisfy EH(u) = uH and ET(u) = uT for all u
in V . So we see that CpH =CH and CpT =CT, and therefore
this approach leads to the same choice function as the
previous one: CE{pH,pT} =CM{DH,DT} = inf{CH,CT}.
Example 3. We consider the same finite possibility spaceX ∶= {H,T} as in Example 2, with the same option space
and vector ordering. Also consider the vacuous set of de-
sirable options Dv and the option set O ∶= {0,u,v}, where
u = (1,−1/4) and v = (−1/4,1). Because all options in O are
pointwise undominated in O, we find that CDv(O) =O. On
the other hand, it follows from the definition in Eq. (7) that
0 ∈CMDv(O)⇔ (∃Dˆ ∈ DˆDv)(u ∉ Dˆ and v ∉ Dˆ),
also taking into account Axiom D1. But u ∉ Dˆ and v ∉ Dˆ im-
plies that −u ∈ Dˆ and −v ∈ Dˆ by Proposition 7, and therefore
also −u−v ∈ Dˆ by Axiom D4. But −u−v = (−3/4,−3/4) ≺ 0,
contradicting the coherence [Axiom D1] of Dˆ. This means
that 0 ∉CMDv(O), so CD′ ⊏CMD′ .
This same example shows that Cv =CD¯ ⊏CDˆ =CMDv .
To conclude this section, we want to mention that there
are other popular choice rules besides maximality and
E-admissibility, such as, amongst others, Γ-maximin, Γ-
maximax and interval dominance [26]. However, they are
not coherent: none of them satisfies Axiom C4b.
5 Indifference
5.1 Indifference and Desirability
For sets of desirable options, there is a systematic way
of modelling indifference [8, 7, 17]. Let us recall what it
means to express an assessment of indifference there.
In addition to a subject’s set of desirable options D—the
options he strictly prefers to the zero option—we can also
consider the options that he considers to be equivalent to
the zero option. We call these options indifferent. A set of
indifferent options I is simply a subset of V , but as before
with desirable options, we pay special attention to coherent
sets of indifferent options.
Definition 10. A set of indifferent options I is called co-
herent if for all u,v in V and λ in R:
I1. 0 ∈ I;
I2. if u ∈ V≻0∪V≺0 then u ∉ I;
I3. if u ∈ I then λu ∈ I;
I4. if u,v ∈ I then u+v ∈ I.
Taken together, Axioms I3 and I4 are equivalent to imposing
that span(I) = I, and due to Axiom I1, I is non-empty and
therefore a linear subspace of V .
The interaction between indifferent and desirable options
is subject to rationality criteria as well: they should be
compatible with one another.
Definition 11. Given a set of desirable options D and a
coherent set of indifferent options I, we call D compatible
with I if D+ I ⊆D.
The idea behind Definition 11 is that adding an indifferent
option to a desirable option does not make it non-desirable.
Since D ⊆D+I due to Axiom I1, compatibility of D and I is
equivalent to D+I =D. An immediate consequence of com-
patibility between a coherent set of desirable options D and
a coherent set of indifferent options I is that D∩I =∅, mean-
ing that no option can be assessed as desirable—strictly
preferred to the zero option—and indifferent—equivalent
to the zero option—at the same time.
5.2 Indifference and Quotient Spaces
In order to introduce indifference for choice functions, we
shall build on a coherent set of indifferent options I, as
defined in Definition 10. Two options u and v are considered
to be indifferent, to a subject, whenever v−u is indifferent to
the zero option, or in other words v−u ∈ I. The idea behind
indifference for choice functions will be that we identify
indifferent options, and choose between equivalence classes
of indifferent options, rather than between single options.
We begin by formalising this idea.
We can collect all options that are indifferent to an option
u ∈ V into the equivalence class[u] ∶= {v ∈ V ∶ v−u ∈ I} = {u}+ I.
Of course, [0] = {0}+ I = I is a linear subspace, and the[u] = {u}+ I affine subspaces of V . The set of all these
equivalence classes is the quotient spaceV/I ∶= {[u] ∶ u ∈ V} = {{u}+ I ∶ u ∈ V}.
This quotient space is a vector space under the vector addi-
tion, given by[u]+[v] = {u}+I+{v}+I = {u+v}+I = [u+v] for u,v ∈ V,
and the scalar multiplication, given by
λ [u] = λ({u}+ I) = {λu}+ I = [λu],
for u ∈ V and λ ∈R. [0] = I is the additive identity of V/I.
That we identify indifferent options, and therefore express
preferences between equivalence classes of indifferent op-
tions, essentially means that we define choice functions onQ(V/I). But in order to characterise coherence for such
choice functions, we need to introduce a convenient vector
ordering on V/I, that is appropriately related to the vec-
tor ordering on V; see Section 2.1. For two elements [u]
and [v] of V/I, we define[u] ⪯ [v]⇔ (∃w ∈ I)u ⪯ v+w, (10)
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and as usual, the strict variant of the vector ordering on V/I
is characterised by
[u] ≺ [v]⇔ ([u] ⪯ [v] and [u] ≠ [v]).
Proposition 21. The ordering ⪯ on V/I is a vector order-
ing, and [u] ≺ [v]⇔ (∃w ∈ I)u ≺ v+w for any u,v in V .
We use the notation O/I ∶= {[u] ∶ u ∈ O} for the option set
of equivalence classes [u] associated with the options u in
an option set O in Q(V). ⋅/I is an onto map from Q(V) toQ(V/I) that preserves set inclusion.
Proposition 22. Given any two option sets O1 and O2 inQ(V) such that O1 ⊆O2, then O1/I ⊆O2/I.
5.3 Quotient Spaces and Sets of Desirable Options
We use this quotient space to prove interesting characteri-
sations of indifference for sets of desirable options.
Proposition 23. A set of desirable options D ⊆ V is com-
patible with a coherent set of indifferent options I if and
only if there is some (representing) set of desirable options
D′ ⊆ V/I such that D = {u ∶ [u] ∈D′} =⋃D′. Moreover, the
representing set of desirable options is unique and given
by D′ =D/I ∶= {[u] ∶ u ∈D}.
This, together with the definition of compatibility, shows
that the correspondence between sets of desirable options
on V and (their representing) sets of desirable options onV/I is one-to-one and onto. It also preserves coherence.
Proposition 24. Consider any set of desirable options
D ⊆ V that is compatible with a coherent set of indiffer-
ent options I, and its representing set of desirable options
D/I ⊆ V/I. Then D is coherent if and only if D/I is.
5.4 Quotient Spaces and Choice Functions
The discussion above inspires us to combine indifference
with choice functions in the following manner: a choice
function expresses indifference if its behaviour is com-
pletely determined by a choice function on the equivalence
classes of indifferent options.
Definition 12. We call a choice function C on Q(V) com-
patible with a coherent set of indifferent options I if there
is some representing choice function C′ on Q(V/I) such
that C(O) = {u ∈O ∶ [u] ∈C′(O/I)} for all O in Q(V).
This definition allows for characterisations that are similar
to the ones for desirability in Propositions 23 and 24. If a
choice function on Q(V) is compatible with I then the rep-
resenting choice function on Q(V/I) is necessarily unique,
and we denote it by C/I:
Proposition 25. For any choice function C on Q(V) that
is compatible with some coherent set of indifferent options I,
the unique representing choice function C/I on Q(V/I) is
given by C/I(O/I) ∶=C(O)/I for all O in Q(V). Hence
also
C(O) =O∩(⋃C/I(O/I)) for all O in Q(V).
This, together with the definition of compatibility, shows
that the correspondence between choice functions onQ(V)
and (their representing) choice functions onQ(V/I) is one-
to-one and onto. It also preserves coherence.
Proposition 26. Consider any choice function C on Q(V)
that is compatible with a coherent set of indifferent op-
tions I, and its representing choice function C/I onQ(V/I).
Then C is coherent if and only if C/I is.
To conclude this general discussion of indifference for
choice functions, we mention that it is closed under ar-
bitrary infima, which enables conservative inference under
indifference: we can consider the least informative choice
function that is compatible with some assessments and is
still compatible with a coherent set of indifferent options.
Proposition 27. Consider any coherent set of indifferent
options I, and any non-empty collection of coherent choice
functions {Ci ∶ i ∈ I} that are compatible with I, then its
coherent infimum inf{Ci ∶ i ∈ I} is compatible with I as well,
and C/I = inf{Ci/I ∶ i ∈ I}.
5.5 Relation with Desirability
First, we consider a coherent choice function C compat-
ible with some coherent set of indifferent options I, and
check whether the corresponding coherent set of desirable
options DC is also compatible with I.
Proposition 28. Consider any coherent set of indifferent
options I, and any compatible coherent choice function C,
then the corresponding coherent set of desirable options DC
is also compatible with I, and DC/I =DC/I .
Next, and conversely, we consider a coherent set of de-
sirable options D compatible with I, and check whether
the corresponding coherent choice functions CD is also
compatible with I.
Proposition 29. Consider any coherent set of indifferent
options I, and any compatible coherent set of desirable
options D, then the corresponding coherent choice func-
tion CD is also compatible with I, and CD/I =CD/I .
5.6 Example
To exhibit the power and simplicity of our definition of
indifference, we reconsider the finite possibility space X ∶={H,T} of Example 2, where the vector space V is again the
two-dimensional vector space RX of real-valued functions
on X , or gambles, and the vector ordering ⪯ is the usual
pointwise ordering of gambles.
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We want to express indifference between heads and tails, or
in other words between IH and IT, where IH ∶= (1,0) and
IT ∶= (0,1). This means that IH − IT is considered equiva-
lent to the zero gamble, so the linear space of all gambles
that are equivalent to zero—or in other words, the set of
indifferent gambles (or options)—is then given by
I = {λ(IH− IT) ∶ λ ∈R} = {u ∈RX ∶ Ep(u) = 0},
where Ep is the expectation associated with the uniform
mass function p = (1/2,1/2) on {H,T}, associated with a fair
coin: Ep(u) ∶= 12 [uH+uT]. So, for any option u inRX—any
real-valued function on X :
[u] = {u}+ I = {v ∈RX ∶ Ep(v) = Ep(u)},
which tells us that the equivalence class [u] can be charac-
terised by the common uniform expectation Ep(u) of its
elements. Therefore, RX /I has unit dimension, and we can
identify it with the real line R. The vector ordering between
equivalence classes is given by, using Eq. (10):
[u] ⪯ [v]⇔ (∃λ ∈R)u ⪯ v+λ(IH− IT)⇔ (∃λ ∈R)(uH ≤ vH+λ and uT ≤ vT−λ)⇔ (∃λ ∈R)uH−vH ≤ λ ≤ −uT+vT⇔ uH−vH ≤ −uT+vT⇔ Ep(u) ≤ Ep(v),
and similarly [u] ≺ [v]⇔ Ep(u) < Ep(v) for all u,v in RX .
Hence, the strict vector ordering ≺ on RX /I is total, so we
infer from the argumentation in Example 1 that there is
only one representing choice function, namely the vacuous
one. Therefore, there is only one choice function C onQ(RX ) that is compatible with I, namely, the one that
has the vacuous choice function Cv on Q(RX /I) as its
representation C/I. Recall that for any O in Q(RX ):
Cv(O/I) = {[u] ∶ (∀[v] ∈O/I)[u]⊀ [v]}= {[u] ∶ (∀[v] ∈O/I)[v] ⪯ [u]}= {[u] ∶ (∀[v] ∈O/I)Ep(v) ≤ Ep(u)},
and therefore
C(O) ∶= {u ∈O ∶ (∀v ∈O)Ep(v) ≤ Ep(u)} =CE{p}(O).
The indifference assessment between heads and tails leaves
us no choice but to use an E-admissible model for a proba-
bility mass function, associated with a fair coin.
The choice function C is therefore based on E-admissibility,
but is not compatible with M-admissibility. To see this,
consider the set of options O ∶= {w,0,−w} with w ∶= (1,−1),
so wH+wT = 0. Hence C(O) =O.
But no M-admissible choice function will select 0 in O:
observe that 0 ∉CDˆ(O) for all Dˆ ∈D′, because 0 ∈CDˆ(O)
would imply that {w,−w}∩ Dˆ =∅, contradicting that Dˆ is
a maximal set of desirable options by Proposition 7.
6 Conclusion
We have developed a theory of conservative reasoning with
choice functions, and related coherent choice functions
to coherent sets of desirable options, showing that choice
functions are indeed more informative than sets of desir-
able options as a tool for conservative reasoning. We have
also provided an intuitive definition for indifference that
subsumes the usual definition for sets of desirable options.
We still intend to address conditioning for choice functions,
and look for an elegant conditioning rule that subsumes
the one for sets of desirable options—and therefore also
Bayes’s rule. Another problem to tackle is related to indif-
ference: Seidenfeld [20] (see also [3]) has given another el-
egant definition for indifference for choice functions, which
he has also linked to sequential coherence. We know that
our definition implies his, but the question whether the two
approaches are equivalent is still open. The connection with
sequential coherence is also an open issue, and we expect
Axiom C3 will play an important role in resolving it.
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